TOPIC:

Walter Frank Chaundy

Wounded in Action, Waaikraal - Bergendal (Belfast), 27 August 1900

Private, 1st Battalion, Manchester Regiment – Anglo Boer War
Sergeant, Gloucester Regiment
Sergeant, Labour Corps – WWI

- Queens South Africa Medal (Elandslaagte, Defence of Ladysmith, Belfast) to 4713 PTE W.F. CHAUNDY. MANCHESTER REGT
- Kings South Africa Medal (South Africa 1901 & 1902) to 4713 PTE F.W. CHAUNDY. MANCH: REGT
- British War Medal to 200849 SJT. F. CHAUNDY. GLOUC.R.
- Victory Medal to 200849 SJT. F. CHAUNDY. GLOUC.R.

Frank Chaundy was also known, variously, as Frank Walter Chaundy or Walter Frank Chaundy – it probably depended on his mood on the day. He seems, however, to have been known as simply “Frank,” and we will do him the honour of using that name as we unravel his military machinations.

Frank was born on 27 August 1876 in the Parish of Tottenhoe, near Dunstable in Bedfordshire. He was the son of James Elias Chaundy, a School Master by profession, and his wife Fanny Adams.

According to the 1881 England census Frank and his family were living at Chalgrave, a rural part of Hockliffe in Bedfordshire. Chaundy senior was described as a School Master and Organist with Frank (Walter) aged 4, sandwiched between brothers Cyril James (6) and William Thomas (3). Also in residence was Richard Harding, a Pupil Teacher, and Elizabeth Adams, Fanny’s mother.

Ten years later, at the time of the 1891 England census, the family were living at Dr. South’s School House at the entrance to the village in Church Lane, Islip. Mr Chaundy would appear to have been employed as School Master there. Dr South had founded and endowed this school in 1710 to give free education to 25 boys and 16 girls, some of which were clothed and afterwards apprenticed.

Frank’s mother, Fanny, had died at the young age of 30 just after the 1881 census and his father had remarried, on this occasion to someone of his own calling – Emma Margaret Ruth Lawther Johnson, a School Mistress – on 27 March 1883.

Aside from a 14 year old Frank and his 13 year old brother William, others in the house were stepbrothers John (5) and Robert (4). As if by way of testimony to his prosperity Mr Chaundy employed 14 year old Jane Matthews as a servant.

As Frank drifted towards the end of his schooling the dilemma of what occupation to pursue raised its head. The matter was settled on 15 October 1895 for on that day, at Manchester, Frank completed attestation papers for enrolment in the Manchester Regiment. Opting for Short Service (7 years with the Colours and 5 years with the Reserve), he was 18 years and 7 months old, a Clerk by occupation and still living at home. He claimed to be a serving member of the Militia, something many boys his age were involved in. Physically he was a diminutive 5 feet 4 inches in height, weighing 122 lbs and with a fresh complexion, brown eyes and dark hair.

Despite being young he already sported a tattoo in the shape of “a star in red and blue” on his left forearm. Not wanting to be outdone, a “Red Cross and a Blue Heart” adorned his right forearm.

Allocated no. 4713 and the rank of Private, Chaundy was attached to the Depot until posted to the 1st Battalion on 30 November 1895. He remained in England until his battalion was posted to Gibraltar on 11 November 1897. Here they were to spend almost two years before being posted to South Africa on 23 August 1899.

Chaundy and the Manchester’s arrived in a country on the brink of war. Seething discontent between the two Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and her larger and more powerful ally and neighbour, the Transvaal, and the United Kingdom was about to erupt into full-scale war ere long. In fact there was almost no time to waste, war was declared on 11 October 1899 with Boer Commandoes streaming over their joint borders with the Colonies of Natal and the Cape the very next day.

In preparation for this unhappy eventuality, the Manchester’s had been moved up to the garrison town of Ladysmith in Northern Natal where they fell under the command of General Sir George White. It wasn’t long before they, and others, were called into action. With the battle of Talana just outside Dundee having been fought two days before, the 21st October 1899 dawned heavy with promise of a fight to come – General Yule had commenced his ponderous withdrawal to Ladysmith and the Boer Commandoes had occupied the train station at Elandslaagte, a spot in-between Dundee and Ladysmith. News had reached George White in Ladysmith of the British victory at Talana (a pyrrhic victory to describe it correctly) and he though it showed him where he too could strike a blow.

Maurice, one of the official historians of the Boer War takes up the story in Chapter XI of his history,

“At 4 a.m. on the 21st (October) French was again on the move towards Elandslaagte with five squadrons (338 men) Imperial Light Horse and the Natal Field artillery. At 6 a.m. a half battalion (330 men) of the 1st Manchester regiment, with Railway and Royal engineer detachments, followed by rail, preceded by the armoured train manned by one company of the same battalion. Moving along the Newcastle road, French made straight for the high ground south-west of Elandslaagte station, and at 7 a.m. his advance and right flank guards (Imperial Light Horse) came in touch with the enemy, the former south of the collieries, the latter on the open veld some four miles south of the railway.

As the mist lifted, parties of Boers were seen all about the station and colliery buildings, and over the undulating veld. French immediately ordered up the Natal battery on to a flat hillock which rose between the railway and the Newcastle road, south-east of Woodcote farm, and at 8 a.m. a shot from the 7-pounders, sighted at 1,900 yards, crashed into the tin out-buildings of the station. A crowd of Boers swarmed out at the explosion and with them some of the British captured in the train the day before. At the same time a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse galloped for the station in extended files, captured the Boer guard, and released the station and colliery officials. But in a few moments shells from the group of kopjes beyond the station began to fall into the battery, one smashing an ammunition wagon. The gunners attempted in vain to reply; their pieces were outranged by over 500 yards, and at 8.15, on the arrival of the infantry near at hand, they fell back leaving the wagon derelict. At 8.30 a.m. French withdrew to a point four miles south of Woodcote farm, and from here sent a report to Sir George White, informing him that about 400 Boers with three guns were before him on a prepared position, and asking for support. The enemy's artillery continued to shell the troops, and French, after questioning the prisoners and the released Britons, and examining more closely, came to the conclusion that there were from 800 to 1,000 Boers in front of him. When parties of the enemy began to appear also upon Jonono's Kop to the north-west he judged it prudent to withdraw his weak detachment still further, and by 11.30 a.m. was back nearly at the Modder Spruit.

Major-General French then moved forward quickly without waiting for the reinforcements from Ladysmith. A squadron 5th Dragoon Guards on the west of the railway, and one of the 5th Lancers on the east, each covering two miles, scouted in front of the batteries and Imperial Light Horse, the 1st Manchesters following slowly in the train. The Lancers were first in touch with the enemy, their progress being checked at 2 p.m. by Pienaar's piquets posted on the low ridge running parallel to the railway. A gun, opening from the hills behind, supported the skirmishers: the Lancer squadron had to retire. But Colonel Chisholme quickly brought up four squadrons Imperial Light Horse, which, pressing forward in squadron-column with extended files, with the 5th Lancer squadron on the right, stormed the ridge and cleared it.

The crest thus secured, the Manchesters detrained under its cover at 2.30 p.m. about three miles south-west of Elandslaagte. Ten minutes later they were joined by a half-battalion 2nd Gordon Highlanders and seven companies of the 1st Devonshire regiment, who formed up on the veld in brigade-line of quarter-columns, facing north-east, Devonshire on the right, Manchesters on the left. The Manchesters led the way, heading for the ridge occupied by the Imperial Light Horse, with two companies covering 500 yards in front line; the Devonshires supported, and the Highlanders marched in reserve. As the brigade began to move, a burst of musketry from across the railway to the north told that the squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards had run into the enemy on the lower spurs of Jonono's Kop. So strong did the opposition there appear that the 42nd and 21st batteries, with a squadron 5th Lancers which had just escorted the guns from Ladysmith, were despatched to the spot in support. A few shrapnel from the 42nd battery sufficed to silence the Mausers, and the artillery recrossed the railway, the 5th Dragoon Guards also receiving an order to come in. The artillery were then ordered to go on at once and open against the main position. On their way to the front they passed the marching infantry, whose directions were now somewhat altered; for whilst the Manchesters in the van still pushed eastwards for Scott Chisholme's captured ridge, the Devonshires, diverging half left from this line, now led upon the enemy's right flank, and behind, in the ever increasing interval thus created between the two battalions, the Gordon Highlanders were extending in reserve.

A thousand yards south-east of the Devonshire, beyond the batteries, the Manchesters had halted near the crest at the point of its curve northward, and this curve they were ordered to follow until it brought them upon the opposed left flank. A mile in rear, still, therefore, in the plain below, the Gordon Highlanders halted, and orders came to them to support the Manchesters at the next stage. At 4.30 p.m. the infantry rose and moved forward. On the left the Devonshires , with 50 paces distance between the single ranks, steered upon the tall cone which marked the right-centre of the Boers. Their march led them at first downhill into the broad bowl which lay below the foot of the kopjes. Shrapnel began to burst over the battalion, but the soldiers pressed steadily onward until, some 1,200 yards from the enemy, severe rifle-fire began to play upon them, and they were halted to reply to it.

A little later, the Devonshires firing line, now stiffened by the supports, advanced again down the bullet-swept slope and gained a shallow donga about 850 yards from the crest. Here Major C. W. Park disposed his battalion for a musketry fight. With some loss, therefore, the Devonshires lay within close range of the hostile lines. So briskly, however, did they engage them, that the attention of a great part of the Boer force was drawn to that direction, and for a time the simultaneous movement against the other flank proceeded almost unnoticed.

The Manchesters, indeed, during the early portion of their advance, were not easily to be seen from the Boers' left. Skilfully led, they made their way with two companies extended in the firing line, over broken ground under the crest of the ridge, and only some shells, aimed at the artillery, dropped amongst them. Out of sight on the right the Imperial Light Horse and the squadron 5th Lancers worked ahead on a parallel route, having drawn towards the outer flank on the infantry coming up to them. In rear the Gordon Highlanders, inclining to the right, followed in support of the Manchesters. A brisk shell fire assailed this battalion as it crossed the rear of the batteries, but, like the Manchesters, the Highlanders for a time escaped the notice of the Boer riflemen, and they pushed on with trifling loss.

Thus by 4.30 p.m. the whole British force, 3,500 men in all, was in motion. As the batteries limbered up, the Boers re-opened and followed them with shells. Only one horse fell, however, and the British guns, moving swiftly between the Devonshire and Manchester regiments, were shortly in action again three quarters of a mile nearer to the front. Under their rapid rounds at 3,200 yards the hostile gunners relapsed immediately and finally into silence.

In approaching the occupied zone the cavalry on the right were first closely engaged. A screen of skirmishers still lay out before the Boer left, and these, as they fell back slowly, had an easy target in the mounted men, who were working over ground of great difficulty. Then the Manchesters, emerging from their covered way, found themselves upon the crest of a smooth and open plateau, which, sloping downwards for 200 yards from them almost imperceptibly, was traversed by a wire fence, beyond which stony outcrops gave promise of shelter. As the foremost soldiers showed above the fringe of stones at the crest line, a sudden rush of bullets drummed upon the level in front of them, and the men dropped behind the protecting stones to reply. As they did so, some of the officers of the Manchesters, leaving their men in the security of the rocks, ran through the storm of lead and severed the wires obstructing advance. But the line was as yet too weak for a forward dash.


Map of Elandslaagte

For a quarter of an hour the Manchesters lay where they were, with frequent casualties, but using their weapons so vigorously that soon the Boers on their front, an advanced party of Lombard's commando, gave back in spite of their leader's efforts to hold them, and at 5.20 p.m. the Manchesters poured from the stones after them.

They were closely followed by the Gordons, who, though under cover below them, had suffered somewhat from the shots grazing the edge of the plateau. At their appearance heavy musketry burst from the kopjes 1,200 yards ahead. The soldiers were in a moment at the wire fence. This obstacle, only partially destroyed, had been taken as a known range by the Boer marksmen, and so accurate therefore was their shooting that soon there was scarce a strand unrent by the bullets.

In the crowding which ensued many men fell amongst the now dangling wires, some pushed through, and some could find no gap. Though the front of the brigade thus became broken and confused, the advance continued uninterruptedly. Now the Gordon Highlanders went forward into the gaps opening in the lines of the Manchesters, some to the left, some to the right. Once at the edge of the ridge, from which, as the troops rushed forward, a detached party of Boers fell back, still shooting bitterly, the brigade found itself facing due north, and the Boer left flank lay exposed.

The Boers broke and ran, save for a rearguard action fought by General De Kock which almost prevailed in turning triumph into tragedy. What followed was the famous charge of the 5th Lancers before the battlefield fell quiet.

At 3 a.m. on the 22nd the three batteries, the 5th Lancers and the Natal Mounted Rifles left by road for Ladysmith, the loaded ambulance train quitting the station at the same time. From that hour onwards the trains, bearing the soldiers, steamed away from the battlefield, the last to leave by rail being a portion of the Manchesters escorting forty prisoners. They were detained until 3.20 p.m. The 5th Dragoon Guards, who had reconnoitred northward, followed last of all by road, and by evening the position was empty.” All had returned to Ladysmith.

The victory at Elandslaagte did nothing to stop the Boer advance and, by the 3rd November, Ladysmith was under siege. The Boer Commandoes, from the Orange Free State on one hand at the Transvaal on the other, had encircled the town, taking control over the high ridges and hills that dot the landscape, placing their massive ordnance in commanding positions ready, able and willing to hurl bombardment after bombardment into the very heart of those who dwelled there. White, together with whatever citizens had elected not to take the last train out, together with about 10 000 men under arms, had now very little option other than to repel whatever attacks the Boers made to take Ladysmith.

Frustratingly the Boers didn’t appear to be in a hurry to expend their energy, seemingly content to wait it out and starve the garrison into submission. There were, however, a few attempts by both sides to break the deadlock. One of these was a concerted effort by the Boers to launch a full-scale assault on 6 January 1900 – the so-called Wagon Hill battle. In repelling this great assault the Manchesters played a very important part. The battalion, under Colonel Curran, along with the 42nd Battery, some of the Naval Brigade, with a 12-pounder and some Natal Volunteers, formed the garrison of Caesar's Camp. Sir George White expressed the opinion that the enemy got into position close to the British defences through deceiving the picquets as to their identity; but precise details could not be got, as nearly all the defenders of the south-east portion of Caesar's Camp were killed. The enemy got possession of that portion, but the defenders clung most gallantly to little sangars and bits of cover here and there.


Map detailing Manchester’s base in Ladysmith

Sundry reinforcements were sent to Colonel Curran, and ultimately, about 5.30, after fifteen hours' continuous effort on both sides, the Boers were driven entirely off the hill. The losses of the Manchesters were very severe: 33 men were killed, 4 officers and about 37 men wounded. Four officers and 14 men of the battalion were mentioned in Sir George White's despatch of 23rd March 1900, and Private R Scott and Private J Pitts were subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross for "holding out in their sangar for fifteen hours without food or water, all the time keeping a sharp look-out, although the enemy occupied some sangars on their immediate left rear."

The siege was finally lifted on 1 March 1900 and the emaciated garrison, weak with hunger, Chaundy among them, was given a few weeks with which to recover their strength before, at the end of April, Buller felt that the time was ripe to drive the Boers over the Biggarsberg and out of Natal. Once this had been accomplished, the march into the Eastern Transvaal began in earnest. The Manchesters forming part of the force which General Buller led to Lydenburg.

It was at Bergendal (Belfast) that Chaundy and his comrades were to take part in the last pitched battle of the war. Buller’s Natal Field Army had resumed its advance and, on 21 August, it marched to the farm Van Wyksvlei. On 23 August, Buller's and French's forces were positioned on the farm Geluk. On the same day, the 11th Division under Pole-Carew assembled at Wonderfontein, and the next day they occupied Belfast.

On 25 August, Lord Roberts arrived in Belfast from Pretoria to take overall command of the British forces. Roberts, Buller, French and Pole-Carew held a war council and drafted their strategy. Initially, Roberts wanted Buller to move in an easterly direction towards the Carolina-Machadodorp road to cut off the Boer retreat. However, Buller did not agree. In a telegram to Roberts he indicated why this offensive could not be carried out:

'I shall first get into boggy country which will delay my advance much, and shall then have to cross Leeuwspruit by a single drift. By keeping north-ward to Waaikraal I turn to Leeuspruit and get a passable route.' (Waaikraal becomes important in the Chaundy context as shall see.)


Bergendal Battle Map

Buller wanted to move northward, and in the end the plan that Buller should advance towards the east was abandoned. French and Pole-Carew would concentrate the attack north of the railway, and Buller's army would advance directly on Machadodorp. The line of attack led right across the farm Bergendal where the ZARPs were positioned. Pole-Carew's 11th Division and French's Cavalry on Buller's left flank would have to attack the Boer right flank. The combined British forces of about 20 000 were brought into position along a 20km front to stage the offensive against Botha's 5 000 Boer commandos spread over a much longer line of defence.

The ZARPs established their position on the kopje and in some of the buildings on the farm Bergendal at the junction of the Carolina and Dalmanutha roads. Dalmanutha is a railway station just to the east of the kopje, which is almost the highest point of the ridge and rises suddenly from the surrounding grassy slopes. It consists of a mass of immense stones and rocky crevices, and forms a kind of natural fortress. The surrounding grassland afforded no shelter to any advancing troops.

Botha commanded the entire Boer defence and, for the first time in the war, the four State Artillery Creusot guns, the Long Toms, were under his command. There were also a number of other artillery pieces at the disposal of the Boers. The four Long Toms were initially placed so as to repel any British advance on Machadodorp and to secure the routes of retreat. One was placed on Groot Suikerkop, north-east of Belfast, to defend the roads leading to Dullstroom. Another was sited at Driekop about 2,5km from Dalmanutha Station, and was still in full operation on 25 August.

On 26 August, three of the Long Toms were placed on Elandskop, Driekop and Suikerboschkop and one in the vicinity of Elandsfontein. Botha's military strength, in soldiers as well as artillery, was far less than that of the British. In general, the Boer forces also experienced shortages of ammunition. On the day of the main battle, the ZARPs in particular faced this problem.

When Buller resumed his advance on 21 August 1900, the mounted brigades secured the hilly terrain across which the Natal Field Army had to move. On the first day, the army reached the farm Van Wyksvlei and occupied it without any opposition. On 23 August, the farm, Geluk, was reached and although Boer commandos were present in the vicinity, it too was occupied without any serious resistance.

Judging from the events of that day, Buller believed he was within reach of the Boers' main position. On the same day, French occupied the north-west edge of the ridge above the farm. Both forces encountered Boer commandos, and skirmishes occurred. On 24 August Pole-Carew occupied Belfast. The British also occupied Monument Hill, an eminence to the north.

Early on the morning of 26 August, French's Cavalry left the farm, Geluk, and advanced towards Belfast. The Cavalry had to occupy the mountainous terrain north of Belfast and Machadodorp. That evening, it reached the farm Lakenvlei. In his support of French's army, Pole-Carew's 11th Division attempted to advance along the Lydenburg road, but owing to heavy shelling and rifle fire from the Boer commandos, little progress was made.

On 26 August, Buller marched his troops from Geluk to the farm Vogelstruispoort. His initial intention was to advance on the farm Waaikraal. The same day, however, valuable information was acquired which would have a bearing on the movements of Buller's army, and the eventual advance on the Boers the next day. According to the information obtained by Captain F W Chetwode of 19th Hussars, the extreme left of Botha's line was positioned on Bergendal farm. After receiving the information, Buller changed direction and advanced directly north across Bergendal.

Chetwode made the correct assumption that the Boers' centre south of the railway was on the farm Bergendal, but he did not observe the Boer positions behind the Belfast-Dalmanutha plateau. These would only become apparent the following day. Skirmishes between the Boer forces and various British units occurred throughout, and were quite severe. However, the British did succeed in advancing close to the Boer positions. Despite a shortage of ammunition, the Boers still succeeded in tormenting Buller's advance, and apart from getting closer to the Boer defence line, no other successes were achieved, and it does seem that by the end of the day many burghers had abandoned their positions. The main battle would only take place on the following day.

Early on the morning of 27 August Colonel Brocklehurst successfully placed the artillery in such a way that the British troops would be able to attack from the northern side and at the same time prevent any Boer attack. Colonel Kitchener's 7th Brigade moved along the ridge from Vogelstruispoort towards Bergendal. The 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment was detached to the right and entrenched itself on the eastern crest of the ridge.

At 11.00, the three-hour, uninterrupted bombardment of the kopje began. The ZARPs were well concealed behind and among the boulders, and despite the heavy bombardment and the sure knowledge that an infantry attack would follow, none of them attempted to leave his position. After three hours, the ZARPs still held their positions on the kopje. Buller then ordered the infantry onslaught, General Kitchener directed Lieutenant-Colonel Metcalfe to take up a position across the main east and west ridges of the kopje under cover of gunfire. His men were to attack from the west. Lieutenant-Colonel Payne was instructed to march the Inniskilling Fusiliers down the face of the gun ridge. Their assault would be from the south. The 1st Devonshire Regiment was positioned to support the left centre, while the right attack was supported by the Gordon Highlanders .

As the British infantry reached the foot of the kopje, bayonets were fixed and the final charge began, with 1 500 British attacking what was left of the ZARP contingent on the kopje. Knox, the medical doctor, who was present at the battle, and afterwards attended to the wounded, gives his impressions of the battle as it draws to a close:

'Bayonets glitter as the infantry double across the plain... The Boers stand up in their trenches emptying their rifles to the last moment. But they are doomed. The majority break and fly, some on horseback, some on foot... Time shrapnel is burst with beautiful and most accurate precision over the fugitive band that breaks across the railway line. Men on foot and men on horses caught in that hail are seen to stumble and fall.’

The day belonged to the British artillery, who started the attack, and the infantry, who completed the victory. The British regiments had to advance on the kopje across open grassland without any cover. During the onslaught, the Rifle Brigade's colonel was wounded. However, the troops reformed and 'swept on their own initiative up the plateau carrying all before them' .

It was at Waaikraal on 27 August that Chaundry was Severely Wounded.

The Boer defence was breached. The following day, 28 August, Buller's troops marched into Machadodorp, and on 1 September Roberts issued the proclamation declaring the entire Transvaal British territory.

The battle might have been won but the war was far from over – ahead lay a gruelling eighteen months of hit and run guerilla-style fighting until, eventually, the Boers were subdued into surrender on 31 May 1902 and it wasn’t until 10 October 1903 that Chaundry was to see England again – his regiment remaining behind in South Africa until then. He had been promoted to Lance Corporal on 31 March 1900 and to Corporal on 20 December 1901 but all the good work done was for nought – he was reduced to the ranks by General Court Martial on 16 May 1902 for “Conduct to the Prejudice of Good Order.”

For his efforts in the war he was awarded the Queen and Kings Medals with the appropriate clasps.

Chaundry’s return home coincided with his transfer, after 7 years service, to the Reserve. He was reengaged into “D” Company on 17 July 1907 and discharged once more on 14 October 1911. In the interim, love had blossomed and he tied the marital knot at St John the Baptist at Kidderminster in Worcester on 17 January 1908. The blushing bride and object of his affections was 20 year old Edith Susan Wibby, the daughter of a Timber Merchant. He was 31 years old and a Tram Driver with the Gloucester Corporation – a pursuit which he was to continue with for many years.

Their union was blessed with a baby, Harold Frank Chaundy, who was baptised in Gloucester on 8 September 1909. The residential address provided was 99 Bristol Road, Gloucester. The 1911 England census revealed that Harold had been preceded by Dorothy who was born in 1907 – she had been born prior to the marriage.

On 22 February 1913 he made a brief appearance in the pages of the Gloucester Journal where he was a witness in a dangerous driving case before the courts. His evidence read:

“Walter Frank Chaundy, 99 Bristol Road, Tram Driver, said he remembered the 18th October. At 3.35 he was driving his car in Bristol Road when the defendant came up in his motor car, which in witness’s judgement was travelling between forty and fifty miles an hour. It was at a speed which was dangerous to the public. Cross examined by Mr Stops: He could not say anyone was actually in danger.” Who was the Defendant? None other than the first airman to be awarded a Victoria Cross a few years later in WWI – William Barnard Rhodes Moorhouse! He might have got off lightly this time round but he had a dubious history with speed. On a visit to New Zealand in 1907 while practising for a motorcycle race on New Brighton Beach, Christchurch, he killed Kennett Frederick Gourlay, a seven-year-old child who had run out in front of him. He was charged with manslaughter but acquitted by the Supreme Court in Christchurch in August that year. In 1912 he was again charged with manslaughter following the death of Arthur William Cheacker on a county road in Gloucestershire while driving his racing car.

As the years flew by the memory of war faded from many peoples minds only for the spectre of a new conflict to rudely interrupt their thoughts. Imperial Germany, under the reign of the late Queen Victoria’s grandson Kaiser Wilhelm II had territorial aspirations of their own and, on 4 August 1914 the Great War took centre stage. A veteran of the Boer War, Chaundy wasn’t about to stand idly by – on 7 August 1914 he enlisted for service with the Gloucester Regiment with no. 200849 and, after a period of time in England, was sent to the front in France on 23 May 1916 – the same day he was promoted to War Substantive Sergeant. He was to endure 2 years and 250 days in the trenches of that inferno before being repatriated to the United Kingdom.

On 24 December 1917 he was transferred to the Chinese Labour Corps before being discharged with a character rating of Very Good and the award of the Silver War Badge on 28 February 1919 (This for an aggravated Hernia). For his efforts he was awarded the trio of medals for WWI.

The 1921 England census revealed that he was still a Tram Driver and still residing at 99 Bristol Road which is precisely where he was living at the time of the 1939 Register. On this occasion though, his occupation was that of Car Park Attendant, the assumption being that he had retired from or grown too old to drive trams.

Frank Chaundy passed away on 18 February 1956 at his home of many years. He bequeathed an amount of £281 to his wife.

Acknowledgements:
- Maurice. History of the War in South Africa
- The Battle of Bergendal, The Last Pitched Battle of the Anglo-Boer War, By Cecilia P Jooste, History Lecturer at Vista University, Distance Learning Campus, Pretoria
- Sundry newspapers accredited in the text.