Anglo Boer War - Hofmeyr: Chapter I - My position with regard to the war

I HAPPENED to be one of those colonial-born Africanders who believed that the Transvaal ought to have given in to the demand for a five years' franchise. I could not see how that could have endangered Transvaal independence. I felt persuaded that a refusal to do so would undermine that independence. Why ? Because, first of all, history teaches us that equal rights bestowed upon the inhabitants of a country never endanger such a country's safety. And secondly, because it is unnatural to expect a majority to consent to the supremacy of a minority. Wherever a minority rules it tyrannises, and when that takes place the fires of dissatisfaction are always smouldering, and sooner or later civil war ensues. I feared this for the Transvaal. I felt assured that giving in to the Uitlanders' just claims (all were not just) would be a masterstroke of policy. And, therefore, I advocated the “ climb down ” on the Kimberley and Beaconsfield platforms in the month of July. 1 then said that I knew I would be made to suffer for my opinions. I never dreamt, however, what horrors of vengeance awaited me. But more. The above being my humble view on the matter, I, all the same, was decidedly averse to the idea of having recourse to arms. In conversation with Sir Alfred Milner and the leaders of the “ Progressives ” in the Colony, I made bold to urge patience. In public and private I strenuously urged it. My devout wish was that England would resort to no other arms than diplomatic ones. Let it take three, six, nine, twelve months — never mind. Be patient — all will eventually come right. For this I

pleaded. I begged our leaders to remember that climbing down is always hard work, and that therefore we ought to sympathise with Paul Kruger. Give him time, act courteously, use every available weapon of diplomacy—only, no war! This was my honest opinion—to realise it, I spoke and wrote and did what I could. Imagine then my horror when I heard that the Transvaal had sent an ultimatum! I knew what this meant. It meant burning the boats behind them; it meant seizing hold of their one opportunity of striking a blow at the Empire—their only one. Thus were my hopes dashed to the ground, and the dreaded war was upon us. I verily believe, to-day still, that there would have been no war, if the Transvaal had not declared it. If the Imperial authorities had any such idea they would have flooded the Cape with troops long before. No, their hope too was, I am sure, that diplomacy would gain the day. Alas ! the unwise Ultimatum dashed all such hopes to the ground. As an Africander, born and bred, I shuddered at the very thought of such a war. But as a loyal Africander I did not consider it compatible with my duty to my Queen to give any one reason to think that by word or deed I egged on any one in the Transvaal to persist in refusal of the demanded reform. I make bold to say that if all the Africander friends of the Transvaal had acted thus, had dissuaded the authorities from persevering in their headstrong policy, instead of allowing them to think that all the Colonial Africanders would fight for them in case of war, there would be no war to-day. No, their friends would tell them—"the Colonials will rise, European Powers will interfere, America is sure to help you, &c.— don't give in." And they did not. But scarcely any Colonials have risen, no European voice is heard, and America remembers England's loyal attitude to her during the Spanish War. Oh, the pity of it all! Things might have been so different. And now, what will the end be? I am writing this in prison—I cannot foretell. I must wait ! I only know this, the British arms will triumph.

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Hofmeyr: Chapter I - My position with regard to the war